This paper analyzes overall economic growth performance in the Arab world since the mid 1960s, with the key objective of developing a better understanding about what drives the growth process in the Arab region. Growth in the region since 1985 has been rather disappointing, both relative to the best performers in the developing world as well as compared to the pre-1985 period . Revitalizing growth in the Arab world would, therefore, suggests asking two pivotal questions: why has growth in the Arab world lagged behind those developing countries that could be taken to represent the frontier in terms of the development discourse (East Asia)?, and why has growth been so erratic and unstable in the Arab world? To address these two questions, I estimate two growth models on the determinants of long-term growth and the persistence of growth, using global panel data drawn from more than 130 countries.
Introduction
The twenty-two Arab speaking countries of the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter the Arab world) constitute the League of the Arab States (LAS). Though since its inception in 1945, the LAS has been mainly a political grouping of countries with common cultural and historical heritage, economic integration has always been high in the agenda. Despite the failure of the League to develop into a viable economic grouping, there exist considerable intra-Arab economic interdependences, especially in the areas of labor, development assistance and investments. Therefore, and despite its limited success so far as an economic grouping, the strong popular political commitment as well the high economic potential for deeper economic integration would suggest that the Arab world could potentially become a viable future economic grouping.
One significant achievement that could be credited to the Arab countries is that they have managed to effectively exploit their relatively high growth for most of 1960-84 period to achieve considerable gains in the area of human development. For example, due to both accelerated growth (in the 1970s and early 1980s) and distribution--in terms of "generous transfers to large parts of the population"-average schooling years increased by 100% between 1960-84 and 1985-1998 , life expectancy increased by an impressive 10 years and average income per capita in 1985 at (5300 in ppp $) was almost five times the income level of 1960. A recent World Bank's report on the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA 1 ), which include the Arab region, observes that," during 1960-85 the MENA region outperformed all other regions except East Asia in income growth and the equality of income distribution… " (1995:pp. 2-3) . The report also credits the region's governments for effectively reducing poverty, "by 1990 only 5.6% of the population in MENA lived on less than $1 a day---the global benchmark for absolute poverty---compared with 14.7% in East Asia and 28.8% in Latin America." However, unlike East Asia growth could not be sustained in the Arab world following 1985, which marked the beginning of an era characterized with episodes of significant slumps in the price of oil, the main economic motor of the region. In many countries of the region, growth has not only slowed down, but has essentially collapsed. This brought the social progress to a grinding halt and kept the region standing in terms of "human well-being" well below the international frontiers (Ali, 2001a) 2 . Consistent with this assessment, more recent evidence due to Ali and Elbadawi (2000a) and Fergany (1998 Fergany ( , 2000 suggest that poverty in the Arab world has actually increased Not decreased, and in some of the most populous countries like Egypt, Morocco, and especially Algeria and Sudan, the depth and spread of poverty have reached very high levels. Moreover, the collapse of growth prevented the region from exploiting the "demographic gift" of an expanding pool of educated labor. Instead, the region is faced with a serious unemployment crisis, only partially addressed by an expanding informal market. Because of its low productivity, and therefore, low income generating capacity, the informal sector is more a symptom of distorted economies than a window of opportunity for addressing poverty and unemployment in the region (Ali and Elbadawi, 2000b) .
It is not surprising, therefore, that restoring growth has emerged as the top development agenda for the region (e.g. World Bank, 1995; Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef, 2000; Makdisi, Fattach and Limam, 2000) . An important consideration in the analysis of growth in the Arab world is the diversity of the region.
Despite their common cultural and historical heritage, Arab countries have very diverse characteristics in such key areas as the structures of the economies, level of development, geographic location, and type of governance and institutions. To highlight the economic diversity of the region, we follow ERF (1998) and group the countries of the region into four broad categories 3 : mixed oil economies (MOE: Algeria, Iraq); Oil Economies (OE), which include the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE; diversified economies (DE: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia); and, primary export economies (PEE: Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen). The 1996 distribution of population and GDP over these categories was such that DE accounted for 48% of population and 28% of GDP; MOE's shares in population and GDP were, respectively, 21 and 24%; PEE's population share was 20% while its share of GDP was only 3% in contrast to that of OE with a population share of only 11% and a GDP share of 46%. IntraArab diversity is also captured by differences in per capita GDP. Not surprisingly, OE ranks top on this scale with a per capita GDP of about US$9000 in 1996, followed by MOE (US$2400). DE ranks third with a per capita GDP of US$1300 while PEE's per capita GDP amounted to only US$300. The production structures of the four groups differ as well. Thus, in 1996 the agricultural sector accounted for 24% and 23% of GDP in PEE and MOE, respectively, and for 16% in DE while it accounts for only 2.4% of GDP in OE. The manufacturing sector accounted for 14.4% of GDP in DE, 11% in MOE and OE, and 9% in PEE. Thus, none of the country groups of the region could be considered as industrialized (defining this stage in terms of a manufacturing sector contribution of 20% of GDP). Extractive industry, however, contributed fairly large shares in OE (35% of GDP) and MOE (27% of GDP). This paper will attempt to contribute to the debate about growth in the Arab world by asking two pivotal questions: why has growth in the Arab world lagged behind, especially relative to the East Asian frontier?; and, aside from the over-dependence on the hydrocarbon sector, are there any useful insight that could shed light into the collapse of growth in the Arab world in the post 1985 period?. To analyze these two issues we would need empirical cross-country evidence on the determinants of the rate of per capita economic growth and on the factors influencing the persistence of growth in a global sample of countries. Section two provides preliminary analysis of growth in the Arab world, focusing on the evolution of growth and other factors associated with the growth process. Section three discusses the estimation results of two empirical growth models---one on the determinants of long-term growth and the other on the persistence of growth before and after 1985. In section four I use the estimated models to address the two questions posed above on why growth in the Arab world lagged behind the Asian frontier? And why has growth in the region collapse during the volatile post 1985 period. Taking into consideration the diversity of the Arab world, the empirical models will be simulated for the various groupings within the region. Section five concludes.
The Story of Growth in the Arab World
Following the collapse of the oil price in the early 1980s, per capita growth in the Arab world averaged just 0.5% per annum during the 1985-1998, which is just one fourth the average rate of growth for the earlier period of 1960-84. Moreover, long term growth in the Arab world has been a far cry from the record of the high performing East Asian economies (EA), which managed high and sustained annual growth rates of 5% or more throughout the last 40 years (Table 1) . However, the experience of growth in the Arab world has also been very diverse, mimicking the diversity of its economies. For example, the DE has achieved growth rates higher than 4% during the first period, which could not be maintained following 1984. The same applies for some OE countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, which grew very rapidly in the first period but saw their growth collapse in the second. Even by the standards of Sub-Saharan Africa---the region that retains the dubious distinction of being the most underdeveloped region of the world---the growth record of the PEE group has been sluggish throughout the two periods (at 1 and -0.5%, respectively). The growth record of Algeria (representing the MOE) has been one of significant growth collapse from 2.5 in the first period to -1.2% in the second. In addition to Iraq, for which no data is available 4 , the post-1984 period has so far been lost to development for the many countries of the region with persistent negative growth rates, including Algeria, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia; and particularly the poorer non-oil surplus countries of Jordan, Djibouti and Yemen. Moreover, average growth in the Arab region has also been volatile, where growth volatility in the Arab world accounts for more than five times that of East Asia (Table 1) . Also compared to the East Asian frontier (or to Sub-Saharan Africa in the case of PEE) annual profiles of growth suggest that it has been very volatile in all regions of the Arab world (Figures 1.A-D) . Also growth volatility in the Arab world has disproportionately rose between the two periods, where relative variability in the post 1984 period (at 5.6) accounts for more than twice the rate of variability in the earlier period.
The received wisdom from the modern growth literature 5 and countless development experiences suggest that high growth is associated with some broad fundamentals: effective institutions for protection of property rights, stable macroeconomic environment, adequate human capital and favorable initial conditions. In most cases, however, growth does not happen without deliberate development strategies for exploiting (and/or overcoming) country-specific or region-specific potentials (constraints). We characterize two such growth potentials and one development constraint of relevance to the case of the Arab world: the advantage of location and geography; associated with export competitiveness and capacity to attract direct foreign investment; the "demographic gift", associated with the demographic transition to lower age dependency; and the preponderance of regional and civil conflicts, with their multiple negative consequences for development.
2.i Traditional Growth Fundamentals:
The comparisons between the two periods would suggest that the record of the Arab world in terms of human indicators has been one of considerable achievements. However, the MOE, and especially the PEE, would still have to overcome a big gap relative to the Asian frontier (Table 2 ). For example, life expectancy has risen considerably in the region, where it rose from 56 to 64 in MOE, 58 to 67 in DE, 43 to 51 in PEE, and in the case of OE it rose from 60 to 72 to surpass EA. Even a more compelling achievement was in the area of education, where average number of years of schooling (for the age group from 15 to 65) more than doubled to reach 5 in DE and 6 in OE, only one year behind the average for EA. However, the averages for MOE (at 4) and PEE (at 2) are still very low. Consistent with the significant progress at the social and human capital fronts, per capita income has also risen considerably between 1960 and 1985, excepts for the case of PEE. This could be directly related to the steady growth achieved by many countries in the region between the two periods. It is also important to note that, except for the OE, for which average per capita income was almost double that of EA (at $6000), income in the rest of the Arab world (about $1800 for MOE, $1500 for DE and only $300 for PEE) is still much lower than the median income for East Asia. Unfortunately, the Arab countries were unable to realize rapid catch-up growth in the post-1985 period, though they started off with much lower standards of livings compared to EA. However, growth is a complex process, which depends on much more than being poorer at an initial date (Easterly and Levine, 2001) .
One measure of the quality of the overall policy and institutional environment is provided by the World Bank's "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index: (CPIA)." 6 The PEE group has the lowest CPIA ratings for 1985 (at 2.1), which is well below the African average of 2.75 (Figure 2 .A). Moreover, more than a decade later this Arab group continues to be at almost the same impoverished rating. The other Arab group for which the CPIA index is available was the DE group, which managed to improve its ratings considerably from 2.8 in 1985 to 3.4 in 1998. However, the quality of the overall policy and institutional environment in the DE group in 1998 still remains well below that of East Asia at 4.2. Another important set of measures of institutional environment is reported by the Political Risk Service Group (PRS), which construct the famous International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We construct a composite index using principal components derived from ten institutional variables (Figure 2 .B). This data is available for East Asia and three groups of Arab economies (DE, MOE, OE) . This index also suggests that the Arab countries were significantly lagging behind East Asia in 1980-84. The combined institutional index for EA was more than 7, compared to 5.2 for OE, 4.5 for DE, and 3.5 for MOE. Despite the significant improvement in the index in DE (by more than 40% in 1995-99 relative to 1980-84) and to some extent in OE (by 20%), the Arab region still remains well below East Asia according to this measure as well. Ali (2001b: Table 13 ) analyzed the five PRS indicators of risk for 15 Arab countries between 1985 and 1997. He finds that all the Arab countries considered achieved impressive progress in the area of "Government Repudiation" of contract, where all countries attain ratings of 8 or 9 in 1997, with a rating of 10 indicating a zero risk of repudiation. Except for the case of Iraq, the same progress was achieved in the area of "Expropriation", which measures the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization. However, the Arab world's ratings remain low with regards to the three remaining indicators of "Corruption", "Rule of Law" and "Quality of Bureaucracy".
In terms of specific aspects of the macro-institutional environments, several patterns could be identified (Table 3) . First, compared to EA the Arab world is characterized by larger sizes of governments, especially in the OE. For example, the share of government expenditure to GDP in 1985 -98 reached 49% in OE, rising from 34% in 1960 . This of course is related to the dependence of these economies on the oil sector, which experienced considerable boom between the two periods. However, even in the cases of DE and PEE, where the public sector was significantly downsized between the two periods, it nevertheless, remains large relative to EA. The shares of public expenditure in the latter periods averaged 32 and 33% for DE and PEE, respectively, compared to only 20% for EA. Second, except for the MOE (Algeria), private investment has been low in other Arab regions for which data is available 7 . While private investments in EA rose between the two periods from 19 to 24%, it continues to be very low at 14% for DE and 11% for PEE, where the latter is comparable to the average for SSA. On the other hand private investment in Algeria declined from 29% in the first period to 20%. The high private investment in Algeria was mainly associated with the oil and gas sector. Public investment has been high during the first period for Algeria (at 12%) and DE (at 14%), though it was significantly reduced in the second period to ratios comparable with the ones prevailing in EA and SSA (at 9%). However, public investment for the case of the PEE has basically collapsed, where between the two periods it declined from 10 to just 6% 8 . Third, except for the PEE and to some extent MOE (Algeria), Arab countries have achieved high financial depth (measured in terms of the share of broad money to GDP), comparable to the East Asian ratios. Fourth, also the OE and the DE have managed to achieve a measure of macroeconomic stability (low inflation) comparable to EA. Finally, in terms of openness of the economy, only the OE could be considered as open as EA. The others, especially the MOE remains very closed.
2.ii Geography, Demography and Conflicts:
In addition to sound overall macroeconomic and institutional environment as well as rapid accumulation of human and physical capitals, growth has also been linked in the modern growth literature to factors associated with "geography and ecology", "demographic transition" and political and criminal violence, at national, regional or international levels. All three set of factors are likely to be strong determinants of growth in the Arab world. On the first issue Sachs and his research associates 9 argue that favorable geography and ecology--in terms of access to long coastal lines or sea navigable rivers and temperate climate-are robustly associated with superior growth record. This literature suggests several channels through which favorable geography and ecology could promote overall economic growth. A high share of a country's area around coastal lines or sea navigable rivers and high economic density along the coast are important determinants of competitiveness, especially for transaction-intensive exports, such as manufactures. Moreover, a high share of non-tropical (especially temperate) regions in a country is associated with less prevalence of vector-borne diseases and high agricultural productivity. Figure 3 suggests that EA, OE and to some extent DE are endowed with long coastal lines and dense economic activity along the coast, while the case of MOE is one of high density but very small coastal regions, relative to the land area (Algeria, Iraq). While the PEE are endowed with longer coasts than SSA, their coasts remain substantially underutilized, where population density at the coastal areas of PEE was less than a third of the average density for SSA. Compared to the non-PEE regions of the Arab world, SSA is itself geographically isolated and has low economic density at the coast. Except for the DE group, all other countries in the Arab world as well as EA and Africa are dominated by non-temperate zones (more than 95%). While this evidence suggests that the DE group has a non-exploited potential, the large share of non-temperate regions in Asia does not seem to have harmed East Asia's economic development.
Second, many countries in the region, most notably Egypt, have entered the period in its demographic transition during which the working age population is increasing relative to the rest of the population (Table 4 ). For example, it is projected that by the year 2010 the working age population in Egypt will be twice the size of the dependent population. It has been argued that this type of demographic transition offers "a demographic window of opportunity", where the high shares of the working age population fosters accelerated and sustained economic growth by increasing labor participation and savings (Yousif, 1997) . However, it must be emphasized that for Egypt and other countries of the region to realize such opportunity, growth must create enough jobs to absorb the huge growth in its working age population.
Finally, growth is also affected by conflicts (both civil and regional conflicts), of which the region has more than its fair share (Table 5 and Figures 4.A &B). First, there is the ongoing Arab Israeli conflict, which affects the region as a whole, especially Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Second, there were the two major Gulf wars (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) 1991) , which have had devastating regional implications, especially for Iraq. Third, there are several civil wars that erupted in many countries in the region, the most devastating of which is the still unresolved Sudanese civil war, which has so far accounted for 34 years of the countries 45 years of existence as an independent state. The Lebanese civil war, which has direct links to the ArabIsraeli conflict, has also been costly 10 . Though regional and international wars are likely to have more immediate and substantial effects on physical capital than civil wars, the latter could have more devastating effects on development because they also destroy "social" capital 11 (Collier, 1999) . Instead, the former could actually foster social capital. Moreover, it has been argued that intense military and ideological threats from the former Soviet Union and China might have been a decisive factor in forcing the Republic of Korea and the Province of Taiwan to become developmental states. However, the two Gulf wars and the Arab-Israeli conflict have in all likelihood impaired development of the region by scaring foreign investments, distorting expenditure and possibly fostering bad governance. 12.0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 growth rate (%)
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Government Expenditures = all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). Data are in percentage of GDP Private Investment = gross domestic investment-public investment as percentage of GDP Public Investment = gross domestic investment-private investment as percentage of GDP M2/Y = Money and quasi money comprise the sum of the currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sector other than central government. Data are in percentage of GDP. Openness = calculated as export and import of goods and services over GDP Inflation rate = measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of good and services. 1962 , 1991 -99 9 Iraq 1961 -74 14 1961 -63, 1973 , 1974 -75, 9.7 1980 -88, 1990 -1967 , 1969 -70, 1973 , 1991 1.7 Jordan 1971 1 1967 , 1973 0.2 Lebanon 1965 -75, 1975 -90 25 1992 -2001 9.0 Morocco 1975 -89 14 1975 -83, 1991 8.3 Syria -1967 , 1973 , 1982 , 1991 Indonesia 1963 Indonesia -66, 1975 Indonesia -82, 1986 Indonesia , 1999 Indonesia 12 1975 Duration refers to the average length of conflict for countries experiencing civil wars (see Table 5 ) Note to Figure 4 .B: Duration refers to the average length of conflict for countries involved in a regional/international war ( see Table 5 )
The Growth Process in and outside the Arab World
Using the above endogenous growth framework-argued above as the most appropriate for explaining the growth process in the Arab region---I proceed to estimate two growth models in this section. The first is a long-term endogenous growth model, using global panel data drawn from more than 130 countries. The second is a persistence of growth model specifying the dynamics of growth between the two periods before and after 1985. This year, as the analysis of the previous section suggests, marked the end of the era of positive and relatively high per capita growth in the Arab world. The key determinants of the persistence of growth are the capacity of nations to manage shocks (such as the one that impacted the Arab world in the post 1984 era) without resorting to shortsighted growth retarding policies. This key concept will be developed below in the context of the persistence of growth analysis.
3.i Long-term Growth:
I estimate an endogenous growth model for a panel of 134 countries over seven period-averages: 1965 period-averages: -69, 1970 period-averages: -74, 1975 period-averages: -79, 1980 period-averages: -84, 1985 period-averages: -89, 1990 period-averages: -94, 1995 . The reported regression results are based on random and fixed-effects models, which also controls for period and country-specific effects (not represented). The diagnostic tests (at the bottom of Table 6a ) rejects the simple pooled OLS model in favor of random and fixed-effects models (Breush Pagan test); and subsequently the Hausman test rejects the random-effects in favor of the fixed-effects model of Table 6b . Hence we will confine our analysis to the results of the fixed-effects model. The results corroborates the version of the endogenous growth model we discussed in Section 2 above as the most relevant framework for explaining growth in the Arab region. The results suggest that standard growth fundamentals (initial income, human capital and policy and institutional environment) are significantly associated with long-term growth, and that their effects are consistent with theory. In addition, the two geography variables were also strongly linked to cross-country growth. High economic density along the coast or sea navigable rivers tends to spur growth, while a high share of a country's land area covered by non-temperate climate has adverse effect on growth. Finally, civil wars tend to have substantial negative consequences for subsequent growth. However, we fail to find robust association between regional/international wars and growth.
The failure of the model to corroborate the likely deleterious effects on growth of regional/international wars suggests a possible co-variation between the set of the explanatory variables. Its likely that the CPIA (or ICRG) ratings takes into consideration the degree of political tensions in the region, which suggests estimating an IV growth model with CPIA (or ICRG) treated as endogenous. An alternative estimation strategy to deal with this problem is to specify two models with CPIA (or ICRG) and regional/international wars included one at a time. The latter approach produced better results, as the IV regressions fail to produce robust results. The results of the two additional models are reported as Model 2a, 2b and 2c (2a', 2a'', 2a''') in Table 6b . The CPIA-based models appear to be uniformly better than their ICRG-based counterpart. Hence we will focus on the CPIA-based family of regressions. Model 2a (with CPIA and without regional/international war dummy) produces a very strong and theoretically consistent effect for CPIA with other growth fundamentals remaining robustly associated with growth. As for the other model (2b&c), which excludes CPIA but includes international and regional wars, all other variables including the former were found to be significant except for primary education, which was subsequently dropped from the regression. Given that this model is clearly more restrictive, because it forces elimination of policy and institution environment as well as human capital variables, I will only consider the model 2a for further analyses. Moreover, the chosen model is superior to the other in terms of overall explanatory power. 
3.ii Persistence of Growth:
We estimate the determinants of growth persistence before and after 1985, which marked the beginning of major episodes of external shocks that affected the Arab world. The regression was based on an error-correction persistence model, and the estimation results are reported in Table 7 below. Following Rodrik (1998a) , the key variable in this regression is "Conflict", which reflect the capacity (or the inability rather) of a society for managing external shocks 12 . External shocks can be economically costly, when social divisions run deep (due, for example, to high incomeinequality) and the societies institutions for conflicts management are weak. Therefore, this variable suggests that the combination of deep social conflicts and weak social and political institutions tends to magnify the effects of external shocks on growth, by leading to growthretarding policies (the precise definition of "Conflict" is provided in the notes to Table 7 ). The estimated coefficient for Conflict was highly robust and fairly stable across nine different regressions, using three different measures of Conflict. The model also accounts for errorcorrection effects, which is the lagged residual of the estimated long-run growth regression 2a of Table 6a . This variable suggests that growth in the current period must accelerate, if growth in the previous period was lower than the rate consistent with long-term equilibrium growth. The estimated error-correction effect was also highly significant as well as consistent with theoretical predictions. In addition to these two effects, the model also accounts for the potential role of changes in CPIA (the overall institutional and policy environment) in the dynamics of growth. This variable partially reflects the economic reforms adopted by many countries, including some in the Arab region, in response to the post 1984 shocks and at the behest of the International Financial Institutions. An increase in the CPIA was robustly and positively associated with acceleration of growth. 12 The measure of external shock we use is the standard deviation of the first log-difference of the terms of trade multiplied by the average share of total trade in GDP in the initial period. This measure captures the unexpected component of the volatility of the streams of income associated with foreign trade. Assuming that the terms of trade follow a random walk (possibly with a drift) Rodrik (1998b) shows that this measure is the theoretically appropriate measure of external volatility. Moreover, Rodrik argues that the fact that this measure treats positive terms-of-trade shocks identically as negative shocks is justified, since positive income shocks could also trigger the same kind of distributional conflicts that obtain under negative shocks. 
The Failure of Growth in the Arab
Taking the East Asian economic performance as the development frontier for the region, the two pivotal questions this paper would like to ask are: why has there been (relatively) little growth in the Arab world?; and, why has the growth, as little as it may be, collapsed following the post-1985 hocks. Using the growth regressions of the previous section, we now have the necessary ingredients to address these questions, at least in a context of a partial equilibrium framework.
4.i Why has the Arab World Grown so Little?
Using the long-run growth regression results (Model 2a of Table 6b ) we address the question regarding the sources of growth that allow the East Asian countries to outperform the Arab world by simulating the sources of the growth differential between East Asia and each of the three middle and high income Arab countries (MOE, OE and DE) . In addition we also simulate the growth differential between DE and PEE. The simulation results pertain to the period of 1985-1988 (Table 8 ). The results suggest that relative to EA, MOE and DE have had huge catch up effect that could be exploited to generate economic growth, because their initial incomes are much lower than those prevailing in the high performing Asian economies. The exception are the oil-rich economies of the Arab world, which has no catch up effect to exploit being much richer than the East Asian economies. On the other hand, the poorer Arab countries (PEE) have huge growth potential to the relatively richer middle-income diversified economies of the Arab world. Clearly, such potential could materialize in a context of a deeper economic integration in the Arab region. The huge catch up effect which accounts for 6-7% growth differential is not likely to be outweighed by the superior performance of EA in the area of human capital accumulation, which tended to be rather small in comparison to each of MOE, DE, and to a lesser extent OE. However, the PEE group lags behind DE rather significantly in terms of human capital accumulation, leading to a much less net conditional convergence effect (the sum of the initial income and primary school enrollment effect) of only 5.6% compared to 7.2% for unconditional convergence effect.
The second most significant source of growth in favor of EA (as well as PEE relative of DE) has been the effect due to the net demographic gift. This effect has allowed, other things equal, EA to grow by more than 8% compared to MOE and by more than 3% compared to OE and by almost 6% compared to DE. Discounting the effect of migrant labor in the case of OE would suggest that this effect is much stronger than indicated by the 3.3% growth differential. On the other hand, the PEE group had an advantage in terms of the augmented demographic gift of more than 2% per capita growth relative to the DE group. The major failure of the middle and high income Arab countries (MOE, OE, DE) to generate sufficient job opportunities to absorb the rising demand for labor, associated with their demographic transitions, is at the heart of the failure of these countries to achieve high growth, or to prevent massive unemployment, especially among educated youth.
Geography appears to be a very significant source of growth differentials between the groups. Despite smaller shares of coastal lines to land area in EA (relative to DE and OE), the much higher economic density along the coasts of EA compared to the Arab region translated into higher growth for the former. The higher East Asian growth due to this effect amounted to 4% relative to OE, 1.3% relative to MOE and 1.9% relative to DE. However, the superior EA performance due to the effect of coastal economic density is more than outweighed by the climate effect in the case of DE, where the marginal contribution of the latter equaled almost 3.5% in favor of the DE group. This would lead to a net growth of about 1.5% in favor of DE. However, the combined effect of the geography factors would remain in favor of EA relative to both of OE and MOE. Within the Arab region, both factors of geography would contribute to perpetuating the poverty of the low income PEE relative to the middle income DE. The combined effects of climate and coastal economic density translated into more than 8% of per capita growth in favor of the DE group.
In terms of policy and institutional environment, EA has dominated the middle-high income Arab world where its superior performance accounts for more than 1.2% higher growth relative to MOE and DE and almost 1% of higher growth than OE. On the other hand, poorer institutional and policy environment in the PEE (relative to DE) is estimated to have accounted for more than half a percentage of the positive DE-PEE growth differential. Finally, in general the effect of civil wars appears to be relatively marginal in explaining growth differentials between the groups. The two exceptions are the case of EA-MOE and to a lesser extent DE-PEE, where civil wars had, respectively, accounted for 0.8% and 0.4% of the growth differentials. Clearly the indirect effects of civil wars through institutions and other channels could be much higher. 
4.ii Why has Growth Collapsed in the Arab World?
A comparison of average growth rates for the Arab region and East Asia during suggests that there are three episodes (1970-84, 1985-94, 1995-1999) of different growth patterns (Table 9 ). While growth in the Arab world collapsed between the first two periods, the East Asian countries were able to maintain their stellar growth performance throughout the two periods. However, the Arab world appears to be on the verge of a hesitant recovery since the second half of the 1990s, while East Asian growth dropped by 50% as a result of the recent financial crises that impacted the region. It is also pertinent to point out that between the first two periods, growth had also decelerated (though not as massively as in the Arab world) in Latin America as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, growth had accelerated in South Asia, even by more impressive margins than in East Asia (Table 10) . Focusing on the collapse of growth in the Arab world between the first two periods, we analyze below the main sources contributing to it.
Using the models of Table 7 , we decomposed the measured persistence of growth in Asia (or collapse of growth in other regions, including the Arab world) into three components (Table 10) . These factors are the capacity of a society to manage the impact of exogenous shocks, represented by the variable "Conflict"; the change in overall institutional and policy environment; and the automatic error-correction effect that depends on whether actual growth is lower or higher than predicted growth at the initial period.
First, the role of capacity for managing conflicts following external shocks, was by far the most dominant factor behind the collapse of growth in the Arab World. This factor--which could be interpreted as a measure of low social cohesion-contributed -0.7% to the collapse of growth in the region. This accounts for about a fourth of the growth collapse experienced by the region, which was much larger than similar effects for other regions. Though this is mainly due to the intensity of the shocks that impacted the Arab region rather than a sudden collapse in social cohesion; the moral of these findings is that promoting social group cooperation is, perhaps, the best available defense against external shocks.
Second, unlike other regions, the Arab world (and to a lesser extent South Asia) appear to have grown much faster in the first period than would be predicted by the fundamentals. This is reflected in the negative influence of the error-correction effect, which suggests that the growth rates of the pre-1984 are not sustainable, given the initial growth environment.
Finally, overall policy and institutional environment appeared to have worsened in the Arab world (and to a lesser extent in South Asia), contributing -0.34% to the collapse of growth in the Arab region (and -0.13% to the change in growth South Asia). On the other hand, this factor had negligible effects for East Asia and Latin America, while the apparent progress in Africa on this area had a marginal contribution of less than 0.1% to the change in growth in this region. However, this effect was more than outweighed by other effects, hence overall growth in Africa decelerated between the two periods. Note: The decomposition of the actual change in the rates of growth between the two periods was computed using regression C3 of Table 7 , where median values were used.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes overall economic growth performance in the Arab world since the mid 1960s, with the key objective of developing a better understanding about what drives the growth process in the Arab region. The growth record of the region has been rather disappointing. First, it has not been high enough (as in the case of East Asia, for example) to facilitate sufficiently deep structural transformation in the region's economies. Second, and perhaps more importantly, growth could not be sustained in the post-1985 era, when it was most needed to expend employment opportunities to a rising share of working age-population. This growth failure, we argue, has deprived the region from realizing a potential "demographic gift". Instead, massive unemployment, especially among educated first time job seekers, became the major source of poverty and have already started to roll back the earlier impressive social gains achieved by the region. Revitalizing growth in the Arab world would, therefore, suggests asking two pivotal questions: why has growth in the Arab world lagged behind those developing countries that could be taken to represent the frontier in terms of the development discourse (East Asia)?, and why has growth been so erratic and unstable in the Arab world?
To address these issues, the paper estimates two models of long-run endogenous growth and growth persistence, using global data over the 1965-98 period. The long-run growth model accounts for traditional growth fundamentals (initial level of development, overall institutional and policy environment, human capital) as well as other factors of particular relevance to the Arab region. The significance of this latter set of growth determinants stems from the evidence that, even with good progress on the above fundamentals, growth usually does not happen without deliberate development strategies for exploiting (and/or overcoming) country-specific or region-specific potentials (constraints). We argue that that there are at least three sets of such factors of relevance to the growth process in the Arab world. These are the advantage of location and ecology; associated with export competitiveness and capacity to attract direct foreign investment as well as health; the "demographic gift", associated with the demographic transition to lower age dependency; and the preponderance of regional and civil conflicts, with their multiple negative consequences for development. The persistence of growth model, on the other hand, estimates determinants of the change in growth between the two periods before and after 1985. This year, as our analysis suggests, marked the end of the era of positive and relatively high per capita growth in the Arab world. The key variable in this regression is "Conflict", which is a covariate variable reflecting the extent of external shocks combined with the degree of latent social conflicts in a society (such as high income inequality) and the institutional capacity for managing conflicts within societies. Therefore, this variable suggests that the combination of deep social conflicts and weak social and political institutions tends to magnify the effects of external shocks on growth, by leading to growth-retarding policies.
These two models, which were corroborated by the data, permit addressing the two pivotal questions asked by this paper regarding the growth process in the Arab world. The main conclusions of the analyses, which hopefully could have useful policy implications regarding the daunting task of revitalizing growth in the region, are summarized below.
First, in order to attain the Asian frontier middle and high-income Arab countries and especially low-income Arab countries would need to continue to improve the overall enabling environment for economic growth. This would require enhanced institutional quality, further accumulation of human capital as well as maintaining macroeconomic stability on a sustained basis. As our results suggest closing this gap would consolidate the catch-up effect that favors low and middleincome Arab countries because of their relatively lower standard of living compared to East Asia.
Second, however our results suggest that East Asia has grown more rapidly than the middle and high income countries of the Arab region much more as a result of its ability to exploit the demographic gift and because of the high economic density along its coastal lines. On the other hand, the diversified economies of the Arab region appear to have an unexploited potential relative to East Asia in terms of the high share of their land area dominated by temperate climate. These findings are important because they corroborate recent thinking in economic growth literature in that while achieving an overall enabling environment for growth is a necessary condition for growth to happen, is not a sufficient condition, however. The implications of this is that growth would require deliberate strategic interventions by the state in order to facilitate exploitation of possible growth potential or to overcome major constraints.
Third, the link between location and climate ecology to economic growth is well developed in the recent strand of the endogenous growth literature that emphasizes the role of geography. For example, high economic density at coastal lines and along the banks of sea-navigable rivers is a major determinant of competitiveness of labor-intensive manufacturing exports. Therefore, a deliberate and carefully planned strategy for intensifying economic activity along the vast coastal lines of the Arab world should provide an important source of long-term growth. Among other things, this would require a provision of infrastructure, regulatory environment and other services. In addition, any viable strategy for enhancing competitiveness of the Arab economies should include an explicit agenda for acquisition of technical know-how especially with the widening technological gap for the Arab world relative to the frontier (Ali, 2001 ).
Fourth, the failure of the Arab region to exploit the "demographic gift" relates to the plethora of structural and policy problems afflicting Arab economies, which manifest themselves in dysfunctional labor and credit market (Yousef, 2000) . The bloated and inefficient public sector and the stifling regulatory environment leaves little space for the private sector to be responsive to the ever increasing demand for labor generated by the nascent demographic transition that started to take hold in many countries of the region. In as much as the demographic transition presents a serious development challenge for the region, with appropriate strategies it could also be turned into an opportunity for generating high and sustained per capita growth. An insightful proposition in this regard was put forward by Dhonte, Bhattacharya, and Yousef (2000) who argue that massive construction in the housing sector could provide an answer to the challenge of the demographic transition. They argue that both housing finance and investment are driven by the growth of the working age population. The key insight behind their proposal hinges on their argument that, "the dynamics of the housing sector are closely related to the demographic transition". They went on to describe this process where they stated that, "as the working age population expands there is a strong acceleration in housing investment while indigenous financing trails, creating a possible constraint on investment. As the process matures, however, housing investments levels off, while the housing stock continues to grow, so that housingrelated savings catch up and eventually exceed the flow of investments. The catch is in the take off stage, when the availability of financing is a constraint on investment; the operation of housing saving schemes and the development of mortgage markets, not the provision of public housing, is the answer"(pp 14). Such a strategy would require an important strategic role for the public sector especially in the area of regulation, including better-defined and enforced property rights, land titling and reducing the historical biases of development policy in favor of investment in plants.
Fifth, conflicts are not only key sources of political instability, but they are also major constraints for high and sustained growth. Civil wars were found to have impeded the growth of the mixed oil economies (Algeria, Iraq) relative to East Asia; as well as the growth of lo w-income Arab countries relative to the relatively safe middle-income countries of the region. The estimated effects, however, are likely to substantially underestimate the true effects of civil wars, which could also damage institutions and other factors influencing growth. Also the many regional & international wars, though not directly analyzed in the growth accounting exercise, must have exacted significant costs on the region. Resolving the problem of the high risks of regional and international wars would obviously require a just and comprehensive resolution of the ArabIsraeli conflict being the core of the region's political crisis. In addition, resolution of other regional conflicts would require enhancing the Arab League capacity for promoting cooperation and conflict resolution among its member states as well as between the League members and other neighbors and partners. Addressing the problems of the civil wars--which remain a serious challenge for many Arab countries--would require a fundamental rethink regarding the treatment of cultural and religious minorities in the Arab world. Recent evidence on the causes of civil wars suggests that civil wars are essentially a response, usually by minority groups, to political repression and economic deprivation inflicted by a dominant central state (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000) .
Finally, the central role of "social cohesion" in the ability of an economy to sustain growth, especially following external shocks is a profoundly important finding. Social cohesion could be high when a society is relatively homogenous (for example due to religious and ethnic homogeneity or because of very low income or wealth inequalities).
On the other hand, in socially diverse societies, strong institutions are required for mediating conflictive (but not necessarily violent) interests among social groups. According to our analysis, social cohesion in the Arab world is impaired by low standards of political rights throughout the region, and high income-inequality in most countries as well as high social diversity in a few others. Improving political rights as a means for enhancing social cohesion in the Arab world, I will argue, is perhaps the one area of public policy (as well as popular activism), which is likely to yield the highest return for economic and political development. First, with increased globalization destabilizing shocks are likely to increase rather than decrease, leading to more frequent episodes of growth collapse in countries with low social cohesion. Second, viewing civil wars as extreme cases of lack of social cohesion, it is clear that improving the standards of political rights should also be a top priority for maintaining the territorial integrity and peace of the countries in the region.
